They create social consensus for the actions that they take.
Review contracts with Private Companies, to ensure the public benefits from it.
Win-win contracts
We have to communicate to find common ground and reach consensus.
Africa’s interest first. Saying I love myself, doesn’t mean I don’t like you.
They want to keep their slaves weak and incipacitated
America is a Rogue State
- America has laws that defend it and it’s people against International Law.
- America takes unilateral action in the name of anti-terrorism.
- The selective application of international law have made International Institutions neo-colonial tools, rather than defenders of justice.
- America’s ability to block or undermine ICJ and ICC and it’s investigations, renders it a tool of Neo-Colonialism.
- The US does not care about international law, nor democracy, nor liberalism. It’s all about their dominance.
- This teaches us that any criminal targeted by America, poses a threat to America, and is not necessarily a criminal.
- Any effective alliance should expect a should response from America, similar to the Muslim Summit in Malaysia.
- The British successfully deindustrialized India and simultaneously industrialized Britain.
- Netanyahu is escalating so he does not
- Saudi must secure a two state solution, before they recognize Israel.
- We should not tolerate anyone that says Jews are better than the Muslims.
- Turkey joining BRICS.
- Turkey is a NATO member.
- Weaponization of the Dollar.
- Weaponization of the Swift System.
- Seize other countries assets at will.
- Slap 100% tariffs against any country that comes up with an alternative to the Dollar.
- The International System is subservient to Political Interests rather than the rule of Law or Human Rights.
- Without Democracy, you cannot
- Every country must come up with it’s own adaptation of Democracy.
- Peaceful re-unification.
Some Actors
· International organizations
· Domestic leaders
· Non-governmental organizations
· Multi-national corporations
. Military alliances
· States
What is sovereignty?
· Definition: the monopoly on the legitimate
use of force within a territory.
– Murders, gang violence, etc. are illegitimate.
– National governments often delegate the power.
. Example: local police
. But the authority to use of force originates from the
state’s permission.
What is sovereignty?
· Sovereign entities are not supposed to meddle
in the internal affairs of other sovereign
entities.
· This norm is well-established today but was
not always the case.
In this Unipolar world, their is an urgent need for multi-polarity and balance.
What is sovereignty?
• Definition: the monopoly on the legitimate
use of force within a territory.
• Dispute resolution between two sub-state
actors occurs through the sovereign states.
• Sovereigns are expected to ensure their sub-
state actors do not use force against foreign
actors.
• Definition: the monopoly on the legitimate
use of force within a territory.
• Sovereign states control their own domestic
affairs.
– But states violate this all the time!
• U.S. incursion into Pakistan to kill Bin Laden.
• U.S. in Libya.
• Russia protecting South Ossetia from Georgia.
Violations of Domestic Political Order
• A man kills his neighbor.
– The police come and take care of it.
• A bank robber steals thousands of dollars.
– The police come and take care of it.
• The party last night got a little too crazy.
– The police come and take care of it.
When Things Aren’t So Great
• A drug dealer kills a rival drug dealer.
– Local police is too weak to do anything.
• A mafia boss assassinates a rival mafia boss.
– Local police is too weak to do anything.
Violations of Sovereignty
• In theory, sovereign states control their own
domestic affairs.
• But states violate this all the time!
– United States killing Osama Bin Laden
– NATO meddling in Libya
– Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia
• …and no one comes to arrest them.
Violations of Sovereignty
• Life in international relations is closer to the
mafia world.
• World police is either non-existent or weak
(the United Nations).
Anarchy
• Definition: The lack of political authority.
• In international relations, no one is sovereign
over the sovereign.
Anarchy
• Anarchy is a world of “self-help.”
– Have a problem? Either go solve it on your own or
convince your friend to help you. The government
isn’t going to come and rescue you.
• Anarchy is not chaos.
A Pull up for
An
* Anarchy is a world of
– Fun fact: most states most of the time are no
fighting each other.
– Anarchy permits chaos…or order…or anything r
World of
between.
IR’s Challenge
• If anything can happen, how do we predict or
explain outcomes?
– Anarchy is a trivial explanation.
– We need more precise predictions and
explanations.
Two Types of Explanations
• Proximate cause: why did this happen the way
it happened?
– Focus of historical research
– Concerned about the proper nouns of the
situation
Two Types of Explanations
• Underlying cause: why was this asking to
happen?
– Focus of political science research
– Concerned about the abstract details of the case
Two Types of Explanations
• We value underlying causes more
– Proximate causes give us silly policy
recommendations that may not generalize beyond
the specific case
– Underlying causes tell us how address what
caused the specific case and other otherwise
dissimilar cases
Examples: World War I
Proximate Cause
• Franz Ferdinand was
assassinated
Underlying Cause
• Military technology gave
states a huge first strike
advantage
What have we learned?
• Don’t let men with funny
mustaches be assassinated
What have we learned?
• First strike advantages cause
war
The Lesson
• Proximate causes are funny
• Underlying causes connect dissimilar
situations and make sensible
recommendations about today’s world
The Strategic World
• There are about 200 states in the world.
• How State 1 acts affects State 2’s outcomes.
• How State 2 acts affects State 1’s outcomes.
• How State 1 acts affects State 3’s outcomes.
• Etc.
Some Pitfalls
• If our assumptions are silly, our conclusions
might also be silly.
– But they will be logically valid silliness!
– Our results are only as good as our assumptions.
* Pull up for
• If our assumptions are too open, we won’t
able to do the math.
– Therefore, we won’t be able to reach any
conclusions at all.
5:
Anarchy, Again
• No world police exists.
• We cannot just make laws to force two states
to be nice to one another.
• Is cooperation impossible under these
circumstances?
Taxes Aren’t Fun
• Tariffs are good for bolstering domestic
companies.
• Econ 101: Taxes raise consumer prices, and
that’s generally a bad thing.
The Arms Race Dilemma
• In a world of anarchy, having military power
allows you to get your way.
• But military power is relative.
– The Roman Empire was more powerful than Italy
is today.
– So a state only makes a relative gain against a rival
if it builds and the rival does not.
• Arms are costly to build.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
• In a one-shot interaction, the players cannot
cooperate because they individually prefer to
act aggressively.
– Some interactions are truly one-shot (preemptive
war).
– Others are repetitive (trade, arms races).
• Can states cooperate with each other by
threatening punishment in the future?
Repeated Play
• The simplest model:
– States play the prisoner’s dilemma twice.
– Moves from the first round are publicly known in
the second round.
Repeated Play
• Can the players cooperate in the first round
under threat of punishment in the second
round?
– Is “I will cooperate today and, if you cooperate
today as well, I will cooperate tomorrow” a viable
strategy?
Outcome
• Regardless of the length of the interaction,
states never cooperate.
• The endgame sabotages cooperation in the
earlier stages.
Payoffs for Betrayal
• If I defect against a grim trigger player, I do
slightly better during the first period.
– I get 2 instead of 1.
• However, I do worse for the rest of time.
– Instead of earning 1 every period, I earn 0 instead.
• Therefore, the most I can earn from betrayal is
Payoffs for Cooperating Forever
• Today’s payoff: 1
• Tomorrow’s payoff: (p)(1)
• Day after tomorrow’s payoff: (p})(1)
• Fourth day’s payoff: (p3)(1)
• Fifth day’s payoff: (p4)(1)
• Sixth day’s payoff: (p5)(1)
• Seventh day’s payoff: (p°)(1)
Important Result
• As long as we are likely to keep interacting in
the future, cooperation is possible!
– Threat of future punishment keeps states in line
even without a world police.
– States must not know when the interaction will
end ahead of time.
International Institutions for make it clear that we want to get along cooperation.
Key Results
• Players can credibly commit to cooperation in
a one-shot game.
– Not possible in a prisoner’s dilemma.
• Inefficient uncooperative outcome is still
possible.
– Stag hunt is a “coordination” game.
– A primary motivation for international institutions.
The Unitary Actor Assumption
• Assume that states are a single entity, and
their leaders are only interested in maximizing
the overall welfare of the state.
Our Recipe
1. Create some assumptions.
2. Do some math.
3. Reach logically valid conclusions.
The Unitary Actor Assumption
• Assume that states are a single entity, and
their leaders are only interested in maximizing
the overall welfare of the state.
– Is this true all of the time?
• No.
– Is this true some of the time?
• Maybe.
• Leaders justify wars using the unitary actor
assumption.
Things You Will Never Hear a Leader Say
• I really suck at running our domestic economy,
so I’m going to fight a war to distract you from
that.
• The media is too interested in a sex scandal
involving some intern I never slept with, so I’m
going to bomb some countries in Africa you’ve
never heard of.
Things You Will Hear a Leader Say
• This war is in the best interest of our national
security.
• We have a moral obligation to intervene.
• Stabilizing the region will secure our economic
interests.
Crisis!
• Saudi Arabia discovers an oil deposit worth
$80 billion
• Kuwait hears about this and declares the oil
deposit to be on its side of the border
• The sides call in their militaries and prepare
for war
Saudi Arabia’s Perspective
• Saudi Arabia will win
the war (and $80
billion in oil) 60% of
the time
• Cost of death,
destruction, and lost
oil: $12 billion
Kuwait’s Perspective
• Kuwait will win the
war (and $80 billion
in oil) 40% of the
time
• Cost of death,
destruction, and lost
oil: $15 billion
Bargaining
• War does not make sense here
• Saudi Arabia’s and Kuwait’s demands sum to
$53 billion
– But there’s $80 billion in oil revenue to go around!
– Where did the other $27 billion go?
• The costs of war ($15 billion and $12 billion) ate it up
A Better Resolution
• Let x be Saudi Arabia’s share of the settlement
• Then x satisfies Saudi Arabia if x > 36
• And x satisfies Kuwait if 80 – x > 17,
or x < 63
Conclusion
• Any settlement that gives $36 billion but no
more than $63 billion to Saudi Arabia is
mutually preferable to war
– Such settlements exist
– Bargaining is mutually preferable to war
Road Map
• All of our models have resulted in peace.
– But these models are way too simple!
– Some strong assumptions:
• Power remains stable through time.
• Everyone knows each other’s strengths.
• Object is infinitely divisible.
• No first strike advantages.
The Contenders
Preventive War
• Definition: When a declining state fights
because it prefers a costly war today to an
efficient but disadvantageous peace
tomorrow.
How uncertainty causes war
Overly optimistic bargaining range
Bargaining
Can be settled by monetary payment, if the losses are less than the payment.
The Bargaining Model
For war to occur between rational unitary
actors, one of the following must exist:
– Incomplete information/incentives to
misrepresent
– Shifting power
– Issue indivisibilities (but not really)
– Some other mechanism of bargaining failure
The primary narrative, which is the reason for the war
Recipe for War
• We need two things for war:
1. Grievance (taxation without representation,
slavery, territorial ambitions, etc.)
2. Bargaining problem (incomplete information,
shifting power)
• With only one, we do not get conflict
– High school history classes are lacking here
Understanding War
• Our research focuses on the bargaining
problems, not grievances
• There are only two(?) types of bargaining
problems
• There are too many types of grievances to
count
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)
• “cases of conflict in which the threat, display
or use of military force short of war by one
member state is explicitly directed towards
the government, official representatives,
official forces, property, or territory of another
state”
How do we measure war?
Correlates of War
• Sustained combat between regular armed
forces of two states
• At least 1000 combat fatalities total
• Each side has at least 100 combat fatalities or
at least 1000 armed forces
Extra-state wars – US vs Al-Qaeeda
Al-Qaeeda is not a sovereign.
International Trade
• International trade is very popular.
– World trade (2010): $27,500,000,000,000
– U.S. trade (2011): $3,800,000,000,000
Example
• California produces a lot of wine.
– Grapes are easy to grow in the Napa Valley region.
• Mexico produces a lot of tequila.
– Tequila is a derivative of agave, which grows in
Mexican deserts.
• California has an absolute advantage making
wine, while Mexico has an absolute advantage
making tequila.
No trade consumption in each country shows that those countries where the item is produced, consume more of the product.
Comparative Advantage
• Trade is trivially useful when no state has an
absolute advantage in making every good.
But why trade if I’m better than you at
everything?
– Answer: Comparative advantage.
– Trade is still beneficial if we have differential
opportunity costs for making goods.
Comparative Advantage
• Every bottle of wine California makes is one
fewer bottle of tequila it makes.
• Every bottle of wine Mexico makes is four(!)
fewer bottles of tequila it makes.
– Mexico pays a higher opportunity cost to make a
bottle of wine.
– Thus, Mexico still specializes in tequila and
California still specializes in wine.
The Bargaining Problem
• States want to trade to realize benefits of
production specialization.
• But the states want to compete over the
surplus!
– California would like to take all of it. So would
Mexico.
• If bargaining fails, both states receive none of
the surplus.
How can international courts settle trade disputes?
Some Facts
• Trade can provide mutual benefits.
• But some can benefit more than others.
Failure to agree on how to divide the surplus
of goods means no trade and therefore no
additional benefits at all.
Puzzle
• WTO courts have no true enforcement
mechanism.
– Domestic courts have the police to execute their
rulings.
– World courts don’t.
• If states live in anarchy, why not ignore the
court?
The Story
• A man and a woman want to get together for
an evening of entertainment, but they have no
means of communication.
• They can either go to the ballet or the fight.
– The man prefers going to the fight.
– The woman prefers going to the ballet.
– If they don’t end up together, they will both have
to go home unhappy.
Coordination Problem
• The man and woman have incentive to
cooperate but have opposing preferences on
how to cooperate.
– Mixed motives.
• They need some means of resolving the
coordination problem.
– Courts coordinate expectations.
Balancing Interests
• States like to trade since trade creates
something from nothing.
– States make absolute gains here because more
stuff exists for both parties.
– Consuming eight bottles of wine is more than
consuming six bottles of wine.
• Consumption is positive sum.
Balancing Interests
• But security relationships are zero-sum.
– You lose whatever territory I gain from war and
vice versa.
• Thus, in security, relative gains are
important.
– Military power is relative.
– Having two tanks is really useful if you are
fighting the Roman Empire… not as useful against
today’s United States.
The Problem
• Trade makes California disproportionately
rich.
Mexico must be worried that California will
take its relative advantage in trade and turn it
into a relative advantage in security by
investing in weapons.
The Resolution
• Trade can still occur despite the relative gains
one actor might make.
– It just must be that the relative potential security
gain is less valuable than the increased
production of the rival state.
Mutual Interests & Mutual Respect
Democracy
Democracies don’t go to war with each
other. And the reason why is the people of
most societies don’t like war, and they
understand what war means…. I’ve got great
aith in democracies to promote peace. And
that’s why l’m such a strong believer that
the way forward in the Middle East…is to
promote democracy. (2004 Press
Conference I
Culture of Contracts
• Behavioral explanation for the democratic
peace.
• In democracies, citizens have incentive to
cooperate through contractual agreements.
– Violence is not allowed.
•
Transparency
Rationalist explanations for war: uncertainty
about resolve causes conflict.
How can rival states be uncertain about a
democracy’s level of resolve?
– Public polling data is readily available to
everyone, including the evil dictators of the
world.
– Less private information → less war.
* Pull up for
Electoral Incentives
• Selectorate-the pool of individuals who can
make up winning coalitions.
• Winning coalition-a group of individuals
necessary to remain in power.
– Democracies: Half of all voters plus 1.
– Autocracies: Military commanders, a handful of
politicians.
Electoral Incentives
- War is costly, but some benefit.
• Easy to buy off a small number of people.
– Saddam Hussein → steal Kuwaiti oil → buy off
his cronies.
• Hard to buy off a large number of people.
– Since democracies share the burden of war
relatively equally, democratic leaders have less
incentive to fight. - Private benefits
There is a correlation between democracy and peace.
Problems with Inferring Causation
1. B causes A.
2. A and B cause each other.
3. C causes A and B.
4. A causes C which causes B. But D also causes
C which causes B.
Wealth and Democracy
• Democracy is correlated with high domestic
wealth. Therefore, democracy causes wealth.
– Yes.
– But wealth also gives the middle class political
power. So wealth causes democracy. The
relationship goes both ways.
Arms Races
• Arms races are correlated with the outbreak
of war. Therefore, arms races cause war.
– No. Bargaining problems (rationalist explanations
for war) cause war. States engage in arms races
to prepare for war.
Democracy causes Capitalism
War is not between two state actors with more than 100 casualties.
Correlation versus Causation
• Clearly, Big Macs do not cause peace
• But countries with McDonald’s tend to be
better developed and open to trade
– McDonald’s only expands to rich countries
integrated into the global supply chain
– Perhaps open trade is causing the peace
Economic Interdependence
• Countries that trade with each other tend
not to fight each other
– True for disputes and wars
– Finding controls for other factors
Explaining the Peace
• Last unit: trade creates a surplus
– Splitting the surplus makes everyone better off
• Two units ago: range of mutually preferable
settlements grows larger as costs grow
– States cannot trade if they are at war
– Trade surplus makes war costlier
Explaining the Peace
Trade makes war less appealing
• The less appealing war is, the less likely
bargaining breaks down for most
explanations for war
After World War 2
- World Bank
- World Trade Organization
- Reducing Trade Barriers
- Ensure States do no engage in trade wars
Other Interdependence Theories
• Exchange of information
• Changing of underlying preferences
Preventive War
• Stupid!
– Oops #1: China has nuclear weapons.
– Oops #2: U.S and China exchange $500 billion in
trade every year.
– Oops #3: You thought Iraq was bad…China has
one billion people!
• Conclusion: Preventive war is not an option.
Summary
• We have to accept China will have a more
prominent role in international affairs.
But we are so preoccupied with our
economic relationship, it is not that big of a
deal.
• China has domestic problems looming.
How can individual incentives cause war?
Wars are bad. Why do they happen anyway?
1. Bargaining problems prohibit negotiated
agreements.
2. Regime types (democracy, capitalism) affect
prevalence of war.
Wars are bad. Why do they happen anyway?
1. Bargaining problems prohibit negotiated
agreements.
2. Regime types (democracy, capitalism) affect
prevalence of war.
3. Poor leadership oversight.
Principal-Agent Problem
We can’t always do everything we want to
do.
– Solution: Hire someone to do things for you.
– Problem: That person might not want to do
things just like you want them to.
Principal-Agent Vulnerability
1. Preferences are not aligned.
2. Monitoring problems.
3. Future rewards unavailable.
Diversionary War
• Imagine your economy is really screwed or
you are terrible at crafting domestic policy.
• Might as well create an international crisis to
distract everyone from this!
– If things go well, great!
– If things go poorly…you were screwed anyway.
Diversionary war: a war fought to divert
attention from a politically unpopular
area to the international arena.
How Can This Work?
• Why can’t people see right through the
diversion?
• Information asymmetry!
– People in a country might want to support the
war if the conditions are favorable.
– But only the leader knows this.
– Thus, the leader can exploit the asymmetry.
Monitoring Problem
• Recall that the principal’s inability to monitor
the agent leads to P-A problems.
• Diversionary war highlights the tradeoff
between needing government secrecy and
requiring government accountability.
• Governments are better informed about
international affairs than their citizens.
– Potential P-A problem results.
• Citizens can remove leaders as a method of
punishing bad leaders.
The Leader’s Options if the War goes bad
1. Continue fighting the war.
– If you lose, big deal. You were probably going to
be kicked out of office anyway.
– If you win, you confirm your original brilliance.
2. Negotiate peace.
– It is in the best interest of the country.
– But you are screwed!
Resolving a P-A Problem
1. Find an agent with aligned preferences.
2. Monitor rogue agents.
– Oversight only goes so far if agent doesn’t care.
3. Create incentive structure to keep rogue
agents in line.
Fighting a Bad War
Democratic Leader
• Will face reelection at some
point.
• Will be less likely to win
reelection if he fights a bad
war.
Has party officials
pressuring him to do the
right thing.
Autocratic Leader
• Will be unlikely to face (real)
reelection at any point.
• Doesn’t have to care about
vote counts, so what the
hell.
• Has cronies encouraging
him to do the selfish thing
so they share the benefits.
Democratic leaders
face electoral accountability and
checks and balances. They have
reason to appease the citizens that they are representing.
Leader Fates
Democratic Leader
• Okay: 93%
• Exiled: 3%
• Jailed: 3%
• Killed: 1%
• Bad outcomes: 7%
Non-Democratic Leader
• Okay: 59%
• Exiled: 23%
• Jailed: 12%
• Killed: 7%
• Bad outcomes: 41%
Peace through Instability
• Victory: You’ve done a good thing for your country.
• Defeat: You tried to do a good thing for your country, but things went poorly.
– Opens up coup opportunities.
– Good chance you wind up exiled, jailed, or dead.
• You did a bad thing for your country.
• But you are alive and still the dictator.
Fighting for Survival
War?
• Victory: You did a bad thing
for your country, but it
worked out well.
– Coup unlikely to muster
support.
• Defeat: You did a terrible
thing for your country.
– But coup plotters are dead or
had to attempt the coup
before they were ready.
Peace?
• You’re screwed!
Thinking Strategically
• Voters in Ohio and Florida are up in the air.
– Candidates must therefore be more responsive to
their desires.
Trade Relations
• On the whole, states are better off eliminating
tariffs than engaging in trade wars.
• But there are winners and losers.
Sanctions
Sanctions are viewed as an alternative to war
Sanctions Basics
• Inefficient
– Trade is efficient
– So why sanction and not resolve the problem
through efficient bargaining?
• Are difficult to appreciate observationally
Selection Problem
• When strategic actions determine whether
outcomes appear in a dataset
– Target’s strategic decision whether to back down
determines whether we observe sanctions
• Biases estimates on causal relationships
Reasons for Sanctions
1. Contain Political Infuence: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an e§ort to prevent the
target from exercising non-military power over a third state, a set of states, or an international
institution.
2. Contain Military Behavior: Sanctions are threatened alone or in conjunction with other measures for the purposes of preventing military actions by the target state or in response to target
military behavior.
3. Destabilize Regime: Sanctions are threatened/imposed alone or with other measures for the
purposes of overthrowing a regime in power.
4. Release Citizens, Property, or Material: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in response to
the seizure of citizens, property, or material by the target state. The seizure need not involve the
citizens, property, or material of the sender, but the sender must declare that the sanctions are
imposed as a result of the targetís seizure.
5. Solve Territorial Dispute: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an e§ort to resolve conáicts
stemming from territorial disputes between the sanctioning state and the target state, or the
target state and a third party. If sanctions are used in an e§ort to terminate a territorial dispute,
the issue is coded as 5.
6. Deny Strategic Materials: The goal of the sanctioning state in threatening/imposing sanctions
is to deny the target access to all or a particular set of strategic materials. For an incident to
qualify under this category, the goal of the sender must be to prevent the target from enhancing its
political or military capabilities through the acquisition of a certain good. Examples of strategic
materials include, but are not limited to, uranium, advanced weaponry, rocket technology, or
supercomputers.
7. Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice: Sanctions are threatened in response to the
possibility or the actual joining of an alliance or alignment between the target state and a third
party.
8. Improve Human Rights: Sanctions are threatened in order to induce the target state to end
repressive laws, policies, or actions. Sanctions may also be taken in an e§ort to compel the target
state to respect individual rights.
9. End Weapons/Materials Proliferation: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an e§ort to
prevent the target state from supplying weapons or materials to a third party client.
10. Terminate Support of Non-State Actors: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an e§ort to
compel the target state to end its support for a non-state actor. Examples may include ending
support for a transnational terrorist organization or ending support for a faction in a civil war.
11. Deter or Punish Drug Tra¢ cking Practices: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target to adopt alternative drug policies, stricter drug policies, stricter drug
enforcement of the drug trade, or as a punishment for failing to adopt acceptable drug policies or
practices.
12. Improve Environmental Policies: Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an e§ort to compel
the target to adopt more stringent environmental controls. Examples of environmental issues
include, but are not limited to, protection of wildlife, reduction of emissions, adoption of cleaner
technology, or control of acid rain.
13. Trade Practices: Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to alter a trade practice or
to punish a target state for engaging in a particular practice. Examples may include sanctions to
end protectionist measures, tari§s, trade restrictions, or devaluations. If the goal of the sender is
to a§ect trading between the sender and the target, the issue should be coded as Trade Practices.
14. Implement Economic Reform: Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to enact
speciÖc economic reforms. Examples may include the implementation of IMF reforms, liberalize
a controlled economy, or enact speciÖc economic legislation.
15. Other
Types of Sanctions
1. UnspeciÖc: Sender threatens to impose sanctions on the target state, but does not speciÖcally
mention what type of sanctions the target state will face.
2. Total Economic Embargo: The sender(s) stop the áow of all economic exchange to and from
the target state.
3. Partial Economic Embargo: The sender(s) stop the áow of certain commodities or services to
and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and
from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed
while a sectorís trade must be frozen.
4. Import Restriction: The sender(s) refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or
set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions di§er from partial embargoes
in that import restrictions only restrict the áow of goods into the sender(s). While the sender
does not restrict the áow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from
being traded in its home markets or impose tari§s or duties on target commodities.
5. Export Restriction: The sender(s) refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported
to the target state. Export restrictions di§er from partial embargoes in that export restrictions
only restrict the áow of goods to the target from the sender(s). Although the sender places no
restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set
of goods to áow out of the sender(s) Örms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an
export control on dual use technology.
6. Blockade: The sender(s) threatens to prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions
with the target state. Such a threat may be enforced physically by the sender(s) military. An
alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target
with similar economic sanctions.
7. Asset Freeze: The sender(s) threatens to partially or completely seize all assets of the target
state under the sender(s)í jurisdiction. The sender cannot threaten to seize assets outside of its
territorial reach. For example, if Country A threatens B with sanctions, A cannot threaten to
seize Bís assets in Country C.
8. Termination of Foreign Aid: The sender(s) threaten to reduce or end foreign aid or loans if
the target state does not comply with the sender(s) demands.
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9. Travel Ban: The sender(s) threaten to cease allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the
target country to enter the territory of the sender(s).
10. Suspension of Economic Agreement/Protocol: The sender(s) threaten to partially or completely cancel or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender(s) and the
target state.
Sender Commitment
1. Weak: A statement qualiÖes as weak if the senderís threat indicates that if the target state fails to
alter a certain behavior, the sender will consider numerous possible options, including sanctions.
An example of a very weak commitment is as follows, ìFrench trade policy is unacceptable.
Germany will consider study various political and economic courses of actions to address this
problem.î
2. Moderate: A statement qualiÖes as moderate if the senderís threat indicates that if the target
state fails to alter a certain behavior, the sender will consider sanctions as a possibility. For a
commitment to be considered moderate, some form of sanctions must be speciÖcally mentioned
as a possible response. An example of a moderate commitment is as follows, ìFrench trade policy
is unacceptable. Germany will consider increasing tari§s to address this problem.î
3. Strong: A statement qualiÖes as strong if an ìif…thenîstatement can be identiÖed. An ìif…thenî
statement means that the sender is explicit that if a certain behavior is not altered, then a form
of economic sanctions will be imposed. An example is a strong commitment is as follows, ìFrench
trade policy is unacceptable. If such policies continue, Germany will increase tari§s to address
this problem.
Threatened Targeted Interest
1. General: The costs of the sanction will be absorbed the entire target state on a roughly equal
basis.
2. Regime Leadership: The sanction is designed to impose costs only on the leaders of the target
currently in power. The sanction does not a§ect those citizens within the target state that are
not a member of the targetís governmental apparatus.
3. Business Interest: The sanction is designed to target a particular industry or industries of the
target state. While the sanction imposes costs on this industry, the senderís sanctions will not
a§ect other industries, political groups, or the general population within the target state.
4. Political Interest: The sanction is designed to target a particular political interest group or set
of interest groups in the target state. While the sanction imposes costs on this group or groups,
the senderís sanctions will not a§ect other interest groups, industries, or the population in general.
5. Military: The sanction is designed to impose costs on the military of the target state. The
sanction will deny the military weapons, funds, spare parts, or other necessary equipment. While
the sanction could impose costs on the military, it does not impose costs on other economic or
political interests nor does it harm the targetís population in general.
6. Other.
Diplomatic Sanctions
1. Expulsion of Ambassador: The sender(s) order a diplomat or a set of diplomats from the
target country to leave the territory of the sender government(s).
2. Recall of Ambassador: The sender(s) order their own diplomats to return from the target
country.
3. Temporary Closing of Embassies: The sender(s) order all diplomatic personnel to leave the
territory of the target state.
4. Ending Diplomatic Contact: The sender(s) permanently end all diplomatic contact with the
target state.
Carrots
1. Economic Payments or Aid: If the sender(s) o§ered the target foreign aid or increases in
economic outáows to the target state in exchange for a change in behavior, the variable should
be coded as 1.
2. Trade Concessions: If the sender(s) o§ered the target increased access to the home markets of
the sender(s) in the form of trade concessions, decreased tari§s, access to trading institutions, the
variable should be coded as 1.
3. Removal of Previous Sanctions: If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s)
o§er the removal of previous sanctions imposed on the target, this variable should be coded as 1.
4. Military Aid: If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) o§er military support
in the form of weapons, training, or the deployment of troops, the variable should be coded as 1.
5. Political Concessions: If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) o§er some
form of political concessions, such as diplomatic recognition, the variable should be coded as 1.
Anticipated Target Economic Costs
1. Minor: An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health of the targetís
economy will be impacted by the actions of the sender.
2. Major: An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the senderís sanctions will
impose signiÖcant macroeconomic di¢ culties on the health of the target economy. Evidence of major e§ects may include abnormal changes (increases of over 5%) in the ináation or unemployment
rate of the target economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships.
3. Severe: An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the senderís sanctions have
the potential to halt the ability of the targetís economy to function. Evidence of a severe threats
include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain critical supplies (such as food, water,
electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign
governments.
Final Outcome
1. Partial Acquiescence by Target to threat: The target state agrees to some of the demands
of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly while continuing the engage in some
of the o§ensive behavior prior to imposition of sanctions.
2. Complete Acquiescence by Target to threat: The target state agrees to all of the demands
of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly prior to the imposition of sanctions
3. Capitulation by the Sender(s) in threat stage: Although the sender threatens sanctions,
the sender refuses to impose sanctions despite the refusal of the target to alter its behavior.
4. Stalemate in the Threat Stage: Although the issue remains unresolved following the senderís
threat, the target does not alter its behavior and the sender does not impose sanctions.
5. Negotiated Settlement: The target state agrees to alter some of its behavior in exchange for
actions taken by the sender(s) prior to the imposition of sanctions. The sender(s) must perform
some action in exchange for the target stateís compliance for this variable to be coded as 1.
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6. Partial Acquiescence by the Target State following sanctions imposition: The target
state agrees to some of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly
while continuing the engage in some of the o§ensive behavior after sanctions are imposed.
7. Total Acquiescence by Target State following sanctions imposition: The target state
agrees to all of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly after sanctions
are imposed.
8. Capitulation by Sender after Imposition: The sender state removes sanctions despite the
refusal of the target to alter its behavior.
9. Stalemate after Sanctions Imposition: Sanctions are imposed by the sender(s), but the target
does not alter its behavior.
10. Negotiated Settlement following sanctions imposition: The target state agrees to alter
some of its behavior in exchange for actions taken by the sender(s) following the imposition of
sanctions. The sender(s) must perform some action in exchange for the target stateís compliance
for this variable to be coded as 1.
Incentives to Misrepresent
• Weak actors want to pretend they are strong
• If easy to do, impossible to communicate
actual preferences
– Talk is cheap
• Leads to inefficient behavior
– Good outcomes for weaker types
– Bad outcomes for stronger types
– Bad outcomes for opponents
A Pull up for
Economic
Sanctions as Signals
• Uncertainty about sender’s resolve?
• Sanctions are costly for sender
• Reveals that sender cares about the issue
– An actor that does not care about the issue would
not be willing to pay the cost
– Allows opponent to update its belief about
opponent’s resolve
• Sanctions are inefficient but less inefficient
A Pull up for
Sanction
• Unce
• Suacsons are coirl
Economic
More Uncertainty
• Uncertainty goes both ways
– Sender’s resolve?
– Target’s ability to weather sanctions?
Targeting Leaders
• Is it easier to identify winning coalitions and
vulnerabilities in democracies or autocracies?
United Nations
General Assembly – Does not create binding resolutions
Security Council
The winners of World War 2 are the 5 permanent members of the security council.
Russia, France, China, UK, America
To discuss security matters and to discuss binding resolutions.
Benefits of a Resolution
• Having UNSC authorization leads to more
inclusive alliances and cheaper costs to fight.
– But this often comes at the cost of scope.
– UNSC authorized action may be limited.
Outside Options Matter
• When U.S’s outside options are bad, China
votes sincerely.
• When they are good, China votes insincerely.
China prefers authorized action, rather than unilateral action.
Libya
• Big country, but most of it
is irrelevant desert.
• Clear cities to protect.
• Clear successor.
• Good outside option.
– China does not veto.
Syria
One-third the size, but
more relevant land
• Unclear what to protect.
• Unclear successor.
• Bad outside option.
– China vetoes.
The Primary Theory
•
States do not feel too strongly about most
issues on the docket.
• The United States bribes the non-permanent
members for their support.
United Nations Ideology
China’s Best Friends (2012 % Agreed)
1. Nauru (100%)
6. Bangladesh (87.9%)
2. Zimbabwe (90.2%) 6. Kuwait (87.9%)
3. Pakistan (89.2%)
6. Oman (87.9%)
3. Algeria (89.2%)
9. Afghanistan (87.7%)
3. Syria (89.2%)
10. Qatar (87.7%)
Israel’s Best Friends (2012 % Agreed)
1. USA (85.3%)
6. Marshall Is. (65.0%)
2. Palau (77.0%)
7. UK (47.6%)
3. Micronesia (72.7%) 8. Czech Rep. (42.6%)
4. Canada (67.2%)
8. Australia (87.7%)
5. Nauru (66.7%)
10. France (41.2%)
Solution
• Create monitoring institutions (bureaucracy).
– Yes, bureaucracy sucks and is costly to maintain.
– But they can flag violations of the agreement and
allow states to correctly sanction violators.
– The alternative is no cooperation at all.
The Fundamental Challenge
• Institutions have no enforcement mechanisms
(anarchy)
• Can only alter behavior by changing incentives
– Compliance to international “rules” must be out
of self-interest
– Spirit of the rule is less important than the rule
itself
